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Introduction

Over the past decade, there has been a growing awareness of the threat
caused by the increasing reliance on cyberspace and the risk to national
security it brings. Cyber "attacks" against the U.S. government can be
launched by a variety of actors with different motivations for intelligence
collection, data or intellectual property theft, espionage, or ultimately to
threaten our national security by offensively crippling a military asset or
critical U.S. infrastructure.2 Notwithstanding, a large majority of cyber
incidents are often aimed at data theft for personal gain, rather than
launched by would-be enemy nations as an instrument of warfare. Whatever
the motivation, the damage from a cyber-attack can be serious, and can put
our national interests at risk.
When we talk about "crossing the line,"-we are discussing at what point
the law of armed conflict is triggered in a cyber "attack" which would justify
a lawful military response. This is a very narrow subset of current cyber
events, and it requires its own set of laws and policies. The last ten years has
seen a significant shaping of the law in this area and even a growing
consensus between the U.S. and the international community as to when a
cyber-event has crossed the threshold into becoming an "armed attack."3
This short article will, at a very high level, discuss the threshold jus ad bellum
question that other panelists are also addressing. In addition, this article will
focus on what the practical effect of a cyber "armed attack" means and how
some of the law of armed conflict principles may apply. Volumes can be
written about these topics, but the goal here, in this panel, is to lay them out
for discussion.
1. This presentation was part of a panel discussion during the ABA Spring of the
International Section on April 26, 2017 in Washington, DC. Ms. Hodgkinson is a member of
the ABA Cyber Task Force, retired Captain from the U.S. Navy JAGC Corps reserves, and
former member of the U.S. Government's Senior Executive Service with positions at DoD,
State Department and the National Security Council. She currently works as a Senior Vice
President in the defense industry at Leonardo DRS.
2. Cyberattack, TECHNOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/24748/cyberattack
(last visited June 17, 2018).
3. CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION 2017, NCSL (Dec. 29, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/cybersecurity-legislation-2017.aspx.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
614

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 51, NO. 3

What does it mean to be in an "armed conflict" in a cyber-context?
Clearly, cyber bombs are not dropping from the sky, but there is a
significant threat to national security that arises from a cyber-war. And for
those individuals who engage in a cyber-attack, what is their status? Are
they lawful "combatants" entitled to prisoner of war status upon capture, and
possessing the greatest right of all in wartime-the right to kill? Or,
alternatively, are they more akin to the unprivileged belligerents we have
seen through the more recent asymmetrical conflicts with Al Qaeda and
other terrorist organizations? Are individual "hacktivists" capable of
launching a cyber-attack? How do the unique challenges of attribution in
cyber space affect the ability of nations to adequately deter, and respond to,
cyber threats? And how do the time-tested principles of necessity and
proportionality apply to cyber-attacks which have crossed the line? As in
wars of the past, does state sovereignty afford nations the right to be
"neutral" in these cyber conflicts, even if a cyber-event passes through their
networks? And once the line has been crossed, how does that impact the
applicability of other cyber-crime laws, espionage laws, and sabotage laws?
These are all questions that this panel discussion and supporting paper are
designed to address.
This presentation will first provide a quick summary of key developments
in the law governing cyber-attacks. Then, it will address the practical
implications of being in a cyber-war and discuss the status of individuals
involved in this war. Third, it will address the principles of necessity and
proportionality. Fourth, the article will discuss the role of state sovereignty
and neutrality. Finally, the article will address the applicability of other laws.
In its conclusion, the article will raise concerns about areas where the law of
armed conflict remains unclear and imperfect in addressing this new threat
emanating from the cyber world.
II.

Growing Consensus That Cyber Attacks May be Acts of War

In July 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense ("DoD") launched its first
official cyber strategy, and listed cyber space as an "operational domain," like
sea, air, space and land.4 President Obama, consistent with his National
Security Strategy, signed a classified presidential directive related to cyber
operations, PPD-20 the following year, which recognized the growth in
cyber incidents and threats against the U.S. government.5 PPD-20
promoted a whole-of-government approach, establishing principles and
processes for cyber operations to enable more effective planning,
development, and use of our capabilities.6 PPD-20 aimed to take the least
action necessary to mitigate threats and emphasized network defense and law
4. U.S.
5.

DEP'T OF DEF., DEP'T OF DEF. STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE

PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE

(2011).

20, PPD-20, U.S. CYBER OPERATIONS POLICY (Oct.

2012).
6. Id.
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enforcement as the preferred courses of action.] The 2011 DoD cyber
strategy,8 coupled with White House international strategy,9 together have
provided a framework for how the DoD addresses cybersecurity problems
with business, civilian government, and by working with international allies
to establish international norms. In April 2015, the DoD updated its
strategy, providing more detail and clarity, which included a description of
the newly developed DoD Cyber Mission Force, created to defend DoD
networks, protect U.S. homeland and vital interests, and enable fullspectrum cyber capabilities for military operations.1o
Several of these new policies have helped shape the overall approach to
cyberspace, but what happens when a foreign government uses cyber space
to directly attack another country? The 2007 computer network attack on
Estonia, generally attributed to the Russian government, was the first
reported cyber-attack by one country on another." Heavily reliant on the
Internet in cyber space, Estonia's newspapers were attacked; the banks,
police, and government were attacked by botnets, immediately
overwhelming the government systems and emergency response systems.12
Similar computer network attacks from Russia into Georgia in 2008 were
also alleged and were more complex, including defacement of government
websites and altering news coverage. 3 While Russian government
involvement has not been officially proven in either the Estonian or
Georgian attacks, several factors have at least demonstrated Russian
government complicity in the attacks.'4 As NATO and EU debated whether
and how to respond to "attacks" such as these-whether as an armed attack
that would trigger collective self-defense under article 5 of the NATO
Charter, or something else-Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, became the
epicenter for the study of cyber-attacks.'5 From 2009 to 2012, a group of
twenty international experts at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense
Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) drafted the Tallinn Manual, which
focused on the applications of international law to cyber operations and
7. Id.
8. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 4.
9. InternationalStrategy for Operating in Cyberspace (May 2011), available at https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/internationalstrategy-for-cyberspace
.pdf.
10. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEP'T OF DEF. CYBER STRATEGY (2015).
11. Damien McGuinness, How a cyber attack transformedEstonia, BBC (Apr. 27, 2017), http://
www.bbc.com/news/39655415.
12. Patrick Howell O'Neill, The Cyberattack That Changed the World, DAILY DOT (May 20,
2016), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/web-war-cyberattack-russia-estonia/.
13. Sergei Boeke, Cyber war and the crisis in the Ukraine, LEIDEN SAFETY & SEC. BLOG (Mar.
16, 2014), leidensafetyandsecurityblog.nl/articles/cyber-war-and-the-crisis-in-the-ukraine Sean
Watts, The Notion of Combatancy in Cyber Warfare, 2012 4th Int'l Conference on Cyber Conflict,
at 235, 241.
14. Boeke, supra note 13.
15. Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down The Most Wired Country In Europe, WIRED (Aug. 21,
2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/.
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cyber warfare.16 Specifically, the Tallinn Manual analyzed when states could
respond to cyber-attacks as "armed attacks," triggering the right of selfdefense under international law.17 Although it has not become a binding
legal document, the Tallinn Manual has become an important source of law
on this subject.
The U.S. State Department Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, was the first to
lay out an official government position declaring that a cyber-attack could be
an armed attack. In his speech at a U.S. Government Cyber Conference in
September of 2012, he articulated several factors in that determination,
which are laid out separately below.'s In September 2014, NATO followed
the U.S.' lead and also determined that a cyber-attack could justify
invocation of article 5 of the NATO treaty.1 9 Under Article 5, the NATO
collective self-defense provision, a significant enough cyber-attack on one
member of NATO would be considered an attack on them all, justifying a
military response. 20 Soon after NATO, a U.N. Group of Governmental
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, the only U.N.
group studying the issue, also affirmed the right of self-defense under article
51 of the U.N. Charter.21 Most recently, in October 2017, EU nations
drafted a document stating that cyber-attacks can be acts of war, signaling
growing solidarity against countries like Russia and North Korea,22 which
has also been alleged to engage in cyber-attacks. As a result, there is
sufficiently broad-based international consensus that cyber-attacks can be
considered acts of war in appropriate circumstances.
In March 2016, the U.S. Justice Department claimed that members of
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps had launched an online attack
against critical U.S. infrastructure in 2013 by entering the computerized
command and controls of a dam in New York City.23 The Iranians also
16. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, 42
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) [hereinafter Tallinn Manual].
17. Id.
18. Harold Honju Koh, InternationalLaw in Cyberspace, 54 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (2012)
(footnoted version of speech delivered at the Cybercom Legal Conference, Ft. Meade, MD,
Sept. 18, 2012).
19. Roland Oliphant & Cara McGoogan, Nato warns yber attacks 'could trigger Article 5' as
world reels from Ukraine attack, THE TELEGRAPH (June 28, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2017/06/28/nato-assisting-ukrainian-cyber-defences-random-ware-attack-cripples/;
Massive cyber attack could trigger NATO response: Stoltenberg, REUTERS (June 15, 2016), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-nato-idUSKCNOZ12NE.
20. Russ Read, NATO Could Go To War Over a Cyber Attack, THE DAILY CALLER (May 31,
2017), http://dailycaller.com/2017/05/31/nato-could-go-to-war-over-a-cyber-attack/ (quoting
NATO delegates to the International Conference on Cyber Conflict in Estonia).
21. G.A. Res. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013).
22. James Crisp, EU Governments to warn cyber attacks can be act ofwar, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct.
29, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/29/eu-governments-warn-cyber-attackscan-act-war/.
23. Mark Thompson, IranianCyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War, TIME (Mar.
24, 2016), http://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/; Dustin Volz & Jim Finkle,
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allegedly attacked the New York Stock Exchange, AT&T, and several
financial institutions,24 demonstrating the widespread capabilities of their
reach and the vulnerability of all of our institutions to cyber-attacks from
foreign governments. Attorney General Lynch worried that an attack on
critical infrastructure, particularly like this attack on the computerized
systems on a dam, could have a large impact on the safety and welfare of
U.S. citizens. 2 5 The need to ensure that all our government's assets are
protected from cyber-attacks is more critical than ever. What about future
attacks on the water supply, transportation infrastructure, hospitals, or larger
dams? The February 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 analyzes the law applicable to
attacks that may not rise to the level of "armed attack,"26 helping to draw
additional distinctions. Most recently, there have been a series of alleged
sonic cyber-attacks, accompanied by a high-pitched whine, directed at U.S.
Embassy personnel in Cuba.27 These attacks have reportedly resulted in
physical damage to at least twenty-two personnel, including hearing, visual,
cognitive, and other sleep and balance related problems.28 Would such
attacks, if we could determine who was carrying them out, be considered
"acts of war?"
III.

Attacks That "Cross The Line"

What does it mean to say that a "cyber-attack" has crossed the line into
the threshold of armed conflict? There have been several different
definitions over time, all of which have morphed into an understanding that
the effects must be permanent and serious. The term "cyber-attack" has
been used very broadly to describe "any action taken to undermine the
functions of a computer network for a political or national security
purpose."29 But Rule 30 of the Tallinn Manual defines a "Cyber Attack"
more narrowly as "a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is
reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or
destruction to objects."30 Consistent with the Tallin Manual, in 2012, the
U.S. was the first government to publicly state that a cyber-operation
resulting in "death, injury, or significant destruction" would likely be
U.S. Indicts Iraniansfor Hacking Dozens of Banks, New York Dam, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-cyber/u-s-indicts-iranians-for-hacking-dozens-ofbanks-new-york-dam-idUSKCNOWQ 1JF.
24. Id.
25. Volz & Finkle, supra note 23.
26. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter Tallinn
Manual 2.0].
27. Josh Lederman & Michael Weissenstein, Dangerous Sound, What Americans heard in Cuba
attacks, AP NEWS (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/88bb914f8b284088bce48e54f6
736d84.
2 8. Id.
29. Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 817, 826 (2012).
30. Tallinn Manual, supra note 16, at Rule 30 (emphasis omitted).
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considered an illegal use of force, potentially triggering the right of selfdefense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter.3' The legal test on whether a
cyber-incident has crossed the line into an armed conflict is "effects-based,"
focusing on the nature and extent of the injury and damage caused on a caseby-case basis and whether it has caused death or destruction.32 An attack
would generally not be considered to have crossed the line when it is
reversible or temporary.33 These definitions have led at least one author to
conclude that the attacks in Russia and Georgia, as described above, did not
meet the threshold of armed attack, as they did not cause permanent physical
damage.34 This author states that an alleged U.S. attack on the Iranian
nuclear program, known as Stuxnet, caused significant enough damage to
the Iranian nuclear program to be considered an armed attack.35
Harold Koh, in declaring the U.S. position on this definition, stated that
in assessing whether an event constituted a use of force in cyberspace, a
country must evaluate several factors, including: (1) the context of the event;
(2) the individual committing the act; (3) the target and location of the
attack; (4) and the effects and intent of the act, among other possible issues.36
He cited specific acts that would constitute a use of force to include cyber
operations that would trigger a nuclear plant meltdown, open a dam above a
heavily populated area that causes destruction, or operations that disable air
traffic control resulting in airplane crashes.37 Clearly, an attack that brings
the same physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would
should also easily meet this threshold and be considered a use of force.
In contrast, the collection of intelligence or exploitation of an enemy,
known as Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), using cyber capabilities
is not generally considered to be an armed attack, as it does not cause
physical or lasting damage38 Cyber espionage, psychological operations,
and propaganda are likewise generally not considered to be armed attacks.39
Cyber espionage, under the Tallinn Manual, is a clandestine, or under false
31. Ellen Nakashima, Cyberattacks Could Trigger Self-Defense Rule, U.S. Official Says, WASH.
POST (Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-officialsays-cyberattacks-can-trigger-self-defense-rule/2012/09/18/c2246cla-0202-1 1e2-b260-32f4a8
db9b7estory.html?utmterm=.E9c3b71536ae (referencing U.S. State Department Legal
Advisor Harold Koh in a speech at U.S. Cyber Command).
32. Philip O'Neill, Law Of War And Cyber Engagement (Apr. 26, 2017), https://static.ptbl.co/
static/attachments/150017/1495047643.pdf 1495047643.
33. Harry Farrell & Charles L. Glaser, The role of effects, saliencies and norms in US cyberwar
doctrine, 3 GEO. WASH. J. CYBERSECURITY 7 (Mar. 1, 2017).
34. Watts, supra note 13, at 244.
35. Id. at 244; see also David E. Sanger, America's Dearly Dynamics With Iran, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 6, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/sunday-review/the-secret-war-withiran.html (breaking a story that alleges cyber activities carried out by the U.S. Government).
36. Koh, supra note 18, at 4.
37. Id.; Nakashima, supra note 31.
38. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31787, INFO. OPERATIONS, ELECTRONIC
WARFARE, AND CYBERWAR: CAPABILITIES & RELATED POL'Y ISSUES 5 (2007); Watts, supra
note 13, at 245.
39. Tallinn Manual, supra note 16, at 46, 192.
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pretenses, act that uses cyber capabilities to gather information and
communicate it to an opposing party.40 The Tallinn Manual does, however,
indicate that actions taken by a state's intelligence agency, or an individual
who acts with a nexus to the state, can be attributed to the state and can be
considered a use of force.4'
IV.

What Does War Mean and Who Are The Combatants?

Why is there so much discussion about whether a cyber-attack is
considered an "act of war?" As a practical matter, what does that mean?
Once the threshold for an "armed attack" has been met, we have "crossed
the line" into the jus ad bellum world, a different legal regime now applies,
and a uniformed military response is lawful in self-defense. Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter permits nations to respond to armed attacks in their selfdefense, and as discussed above, there is growing consensus of this right.42
The individuals responsible for the attack can be considered "combatants,"
which means they can be considered as legitimate military targets.43 In the
cyber world, there are several different actors that can carry out cyberattacks. Among these are militaries, other government agencies, private
companies, terrorist organizations, and individual actors sometimes referred
to as "hacktivists."4* The facts and circumstances surrounding the individual

engaging in a possible cyber-attack are central to determining whether that
individual can be considered a combatant, and whether the combatant's
status is lawful or unlawful.45
In an armed conflict generally, to be considered a lawful combatant, a
combatant must be either a member of a regular armed group, or a member
of an irregular armed force.46 Members of a regular armed enemy force,

carrying out cyber-attacks as one of their means and methods of warfare,
would generally be considered lawful combatants.47 Moreover, cyber
warfare, as long as it is conducted lawfully, can be a legitimate, effective, and
precise tool for members of an armed force.48 In fact, many cyber scholars
have recommended that nations choosing to engage in computer network
attacks should use only members of their regular armed forces in furtherance
40. Id. at 193.
41. Id. at 51.
42. U.N. Charter art. 51.
43. See Watts, supra note 13, at 241.
44. See Laurie R. Blank, InternationalLaw and Cyber Threatsfrom Non-State Actors, 89 INT'L L.

406, 407 (2013).
45. Id.

STUD.

46. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12,

1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
47. Id.
48. James M. Acton, Cyber Weapons and Precision-GuidedMunitions,

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

FOR INT'L PEACE (Oct. 16, 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/16/cyber-weaonsand-precision-guided-munitions-pub-73 397.
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of these activities, to ensure the activity is viewed as lawful.49 If members of

a regular armed group carry out cyber-attacks in a manner that is unlawful,
however, then they can be tried by a military commission or other national
court for any crimes they commit during the conflict, just like any other
crime.50
For members of an irregular armed group engaged in cyber-attacks, they
must meet four criteria to be considered as lawful combatant, as in any
conflict. The must be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates, wear a fixed insignia or emblem recognizable at a distance,
carry weapons openly, and follow the laws of war. 51 Failure to meet these
four standards results in a classification of "unlawful combatant" or
"unprivileged belligerent," and does not afford the individual the full
panoply of protections under the Geneva Conventions-including most
specifically, the rights to Prisoner of War (POW) Status,52 or the right to be
considered a belligerent and be eligible to lawfully "kill" enemy
belligerents53
For a cyber-belligerent who is not connected to a traditional armed enemy
force of another nation, they will generally fail to meet these four criteria in
a number of ways. The lack of responsible command and failure to wear a
distinctive insignia recognizable from a distance will both be very difficult to
overcome. A cyber-attacker or "hacker" generally does not distinguish
himself, but rather, blends in with the civilian population to launch attacks
that are not attributable. Because a computer is generally not going to be
considered a "weapon," or one that could be carried openly, a determination
would need to be made that a cyber-attack could be treated as a "weapon"
when used to cause harm or as a threat to a nation's security.54 It would still
nonetheless be difficult to determine what carrying this cyberspace weapon
"openly" would entail. Similarly, a cyber-attacker or "hacker" rarely
49. See, e.g., Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of
Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L LJ. 179, 187 (2006); Louise DoswaldBeck, Some Thoughts on Computer Network Attack and the InternationalLaw ofArmed Conflict, 76
INT'L L. STUD., 163-85 (2002); Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack
and the Jus in Bello, 84 IRRC 846 (2002); Adam Sherman, Forward unto the Digital Breach:
Exploring the Legal Status of Tomorrow's High-Tech Warriors, CHI. J. INT'L L. 335, 3 39-40 (2004);
Watts, supra note 13, at 245.
50. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 46.
51. Id.; see also Regulations concerning the Law and Customs of War on Land, Hague
Convention, Oct. 18, 1907; Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War, Brussels Regulation, Aug. 27, 1874 (for discussion of the development of these
customs under the law of armed conflict).
52. Maurizio d'Urso, The Cyber Combatant Status, a New Status for a New Type of Warrior, at
476 SPRINGER LINK (Feb. 27, 2015), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/sl3347-0150196-9; Watts, supra note 13, at 241-42.
53. See ANICEE vAN ENGELAND, CIVILIAN OR COMBATANT? A CHALLENGE FOR THE 21sT
CENTURY, 45 (2011); Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTs 65 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995); Watts, supra note 9, at
241-42.
54. See d'Urso, supra note 52.
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acknowledges who they are, making it difficult to claim that they are
carrying their computer weapon "openly.",, Is it enough to claim the attack
once it is launched, or put a label on it (e.g. "From ISIL with Love"?), or
does it need to be claimed before the attack begins to make it "open"? That
would be unlikely, given the surprise nature of most cyber-attacks and the
rapid speed at which they occur. 56 One of the key challenges of cyberspace is
the lack of attribution, because there is no label on the weapon, like on a
traditional bomb or other type of return address.57 While these
characteristics of "distinction," like being able to see and distinguish an
attacking enemy, have been blurred during 20th century conflict where shots
and missiles are often fired from a significant distance away, the criteria have
nonetheless remained constant under the law.58
The last part of the test is that the belligerent follow the law of armed
conflict, and therefore the cyber-attack can only be launched against a lawful
military objective versus a civilian target or population. Many cyber-attacks
that have been seen openly have specifically targeted the civilian population
or computer networks, and accordingly, most belligerents would fail to meet
this part of the test as well. In nearly all the current attacks we are seeing,
these characteristics-lack of attribution or distinctive insignia, failure to
carry weapons openly, and attacks launched at civilian objects, versus
military ones-ensure that the cyber combatant is at best an unlawful
combatant or unprivileged belligerent.
According to the Tallinn Manual, when unlawful combatants take part in
hostilities, they forfeit their own protection from such attacks while they
participate in the conflict and may be lawfully attacked.59 This means that
cyber attackers may be targeted lawfully by a legitimate armed force
exercising self-defense, even though they are not privileged belligerents.
Furthermore, contrary to popular belief, a cyber-attack does not need to be
countered by a cyber-response, enabling the military force acting in selfdefense to use any lawful method of warfare.60 According to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), three criteria must be
met for a civilian to be considered a combatant because the individual is
directly participating in hostilities:
1. The act must cause harm to the military operations or military
capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, inflict death,
injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct
attack (threshold of harm);
5 5. Id.
56. See Jake B. Sher, Anonymous Armies: Modern "Cyber-Combatants"and Their Prospective Rights
Under InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 28 PACE INT'L L. REv. 233 (Apr. 2016).
57. Id.
58. Watts, supra note 13, at 241.
59. Tallinn Manual, supra note 16, at 104 (deriving this rule from Additional Protocol I,
Geneva Conventions, art. 51, at para. 3, which is lawfully binding on States Party and is
considered customary international law by others).
60. Koh, supra note 18.
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2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm
(direct causation); and
3. The act must cause harm in support of a party to the conflict and to
the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).61
These criteria are the same in the cyber context and need to be applied to
the facts and circumstances of the attack. Further, the ICRC has argued that
time and continuity are other elements that must be considered when
categorizing a civilian as a lawful military target.62
Beyond the standard for a civilian "directly participating" in the conflict
above, members of an organized armed group who are engaged in a
"continuous combat function" can also be targeted at any time.63 In the
context of cyber-attacks, one author has described "members of an organized
group" to include chat rooms or other internet groups. Individuals who
provide a "continuous combat function" are administrators and organizers of
a cyber community who give its members permission to use its services,
other support staff that provides services and technical support, advisors, and
the supporting staff that provide services and technical support, and "senior
members or moderators" (distinguished from the others by the quality of
their contribution to the community).64 Accordingly, cyber combatants are
not in a law-free zone when the law of armed conflict can be applied.
Notwithstanding, there may also be criminal laws that criminalize cyberattacks as well that are applicable.
V.

Jus In Bello Rules Of Necessity And Proportionality
A legitimate exercise of self-defense must comply with the principles of

necessity and proportionality to be lawful.65 A state meets the requirement

of necessity when it cannot settle the dispute by any other peaceful means
and must resort to the use of force.66 In the cyber context, this is no
different. A state will have to articulate the case that it must resort to selfdefense, because there is no peaceful way of preventing the attack.67 Given
the time period during which a cyber-attack occurs and the potential severity
of the attack, complying with the principle of necessity will not be difficult
for the types of cyber-attacks that cross the line into jus ad bellum.
Furthermore, the concept of anticipatory self-defense may come into play in
61.

NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION

(Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross,
2009) [hereinafter ICRC DPH Study].
62. Id.; d'Urso supra note 52, at 477.
63. Id.
64. d'Urso supra note 52, at 477.
65. David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in jus Ad Bellum,
EUR. J. INT'L L. 24, 235-82 (2013).
66. David Graham, Cyber Threatsand the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 87, 88
(2010).
67. Id.
IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw
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these cyber events as well, when a cyber-attack is imminent.68 Anticipatory
self-defense, as articulated by Secretary of State Webster in the Caroline
affair of 1836, exists when the necessity of self-defense is "instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."69 Again, due to the time sensitive nature of cyber-attacks and
lack of attribution, there may be times when a nation needs to act in
anticipatory self-defense of an impending cyber-attack.
On the concept of proportionality, a state will meet the legal test of
proportionality when it limits the use of self-defense to defeat the ongoing
attack or deter a future attack.70 Proportionality also prohibits attacks that
are expected to cause incidental life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian
objects that are excessive in comparison with the concrete military advantage
to be gained:' In the cyber world, proportionality will require an
assessment of the effects of cyber weapons on military and civilian personnel
and infrastructure, the physical damage that cyber-attack may cause, and the
potential effects of such an attack on civilian objects, including civilian
computers that may be linked to computers that are considered to be lawful
military objectives.72 In assessing proportionality, beyond the damage from
the cyber-attack, commanders need to also consider the indirect effects that
the cyber-attack may cause, which are second and third order effects that
may occur through intermediate events. 3 These indirect effects, however,
must be expected in order for a commander to be held accountable.74 Lastly,
to be a proportional response, a cyber-attack does not need to be countered
with only cyber capabilities, which is to say that a cyber-attack can be
countered with any other lawful and proportional military action75
In the armed conflict context, any military response to a cyber-attack must
also be subject to a determination as to whether the weapon itself is lawful.76

Generally, a weapons review would determine whether a particular weapon
is inherently indiscriminate, which means it could never be used as it does
not comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality as discussed
above.77 Further, each specific use of a particular weapon must also be
68. Tallinn Manual, supra note 16, at 63.
69. British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, THE AVALON PROJECT, http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th-century/br-1842d.asp (last visited Jun. 17, 2018); see also Graham,
supra note 66, at 88.
70. Graham, supra note 66, at 88.
71. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, art.
51(b); Eric Talbot Jenson, Cyber Attacks: Proportionalityand Precautions in Attack, 89 NAT'L L.
STUD.

198, 204 (2013).

72. Jenson, supra note 71, at 205; Koh. supra note 18, at 5.
73. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-60, JOINT TARGETING, at 1-10 (2007).
74. Jenson, supra note 71, at 206.
75. Koh, supra note 18, at 5.
76. Gary D. Brown and Andrew 0. Metcalf, Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT'L SEC. L.
& POL'Y 115 (2014).
77. Koh, supra note 18, at 6; see also Tallinn Manual, supra note 16, at 153.
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analyzed to ensure that its use complies with the law of armed conflict.78

The U.S. military permits the use of offensive operations in cyberspace
which damage or cause destruction as long as they are conducted in
accordance with the law of armed conflict.79 Accordingly, there are cyber
weapons that are not inherently indiscriminate.so Cyber weapons have been
compared to Precision-Guided Munitions because they have the ability to
cause damage to carefully selected and tailored objects.s1 This allows cyber
weapons to minimize both damage to the individuals delivering the weapon,
as well as to innocent civilians not taking part in the conflict, which could be
a potential benefit of their use. 82 A tailored use of cyber weapons by a
military force, for example, is preferable to an attack that causes excessive
damage to an unintended target and could cause an escalation of a conflict.83

In the case of the Estonia and Georgia attacks, as examples, the cyberattacks
did not result in loss of life or cause significant damage beyond their
intended target.84 But there is a general perception that these types of
attacks do cause damage to non-military computers and civilians.85
VI.

State Sovereignty And Neutrality

While the concepts of state sovereignty and neutrality apply in
cyberspace, the challenge of attribution makes them even more complex. In
the cyberattacks in Estonia, Georgia, and Stuxnet, none of the sovereign
governments alleged to have committed the attacks have admitted
responsibility for them.86 The attribution issue, therefore provides both a

sword and a shield for governments. They are often unable to determine in
a timely manner whether and when an attack was launched from within their

territory (to accept responsibility), and this very uncertainty affords states
with the ability to initiate their own attacks knowing full well that timely
attribution will be challenging87
States have the right develop their cyberspace in any manner free from
interference by other nations.88 The Tallinn Manual sets forth the principle
that sovereign states have control over their cyberspace.89 This affords
78. Id.
79. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, 340 (2015).

80. Steven M. Bellovin et al., Limiting The Undesired Impact Of Cyber Weapons: Technical
Requirements And Poliy Implications, 3 J. CYBERSECURITY 59, 61-4 (2017).
8 1. James M. Acton, Cyber Weapons and Precision-GuidedMunitions, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
INT'L PEACE (Oct. 16, 2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/16/cyber-weaons-andprecision-guided-munitions-pub-73 397
82. Id.
83. Bellovin et al., supra note 80.
84. Id.
85. See Acton, supra note 81.
86. Eric T. Jensen, Cyber Sovereignty: The Way Ahead, TEX. INT'L L.J. 278, 279 (2015).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 288.
89. Tallinn Manual, supra note 16, at 15.
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States the right to exercise territorial jurisdiction over cyberspace activities
within their country and to protect their internal cyber space from threats
emanating from outside of the State.90 Not every cyber intrusion into a
foreign nation will constitute a violation of sovereignty, however, it is
generally considered that there must be some degree of damage.91 For
example, cyber espionage is an act that is not considered to be a violation of
sovereignty as espionage itself is not considered to be unlawful under
international law.92 As espionage does not generally cause damage, this
makes sense. The U.S. articulated in its 2011 International Strategy on
Cyberspace that activities such as network attack, exploitation of networks,
and other hostile acts that might threaten peace and security or harm civil
liberties and privacy could be considered violations of sovereignty.93
Consistent with the growing body of law in this area, there must be some
damage to violate sovereignty.
As part of this right to exercise territorial sovereignty over their
cyberspace, states are also considered to have a duty to prevent their
territory from being used for cyberattacks against other states. These duties
may include the need to increase law enforcement through passing more
criminal laws, investigating possible violations, and prosecuting
perpetrators. 94
In a traditional state-on-state conflict, state sovereignty prevents states
from using force without a self-defense justification under article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, a U.N. Security Council resolution, or the consent of the
nation in question.95 When you have crossed the line in an armed conflict in
the cyber context, a state must still take the sovereignty of other nations into
account. 96 The jurisdiction of the state being attacked will govern the
activities in that state. In addition, however, an offensive cyber-attack
conducted against one state may also have effects on a third state, due to the
interconnected nature of cyberspace.97 In fact, one of the challenges to state
sovereignty with cyberattacks is an email or cyber malware that may be
broken up into data packets and transmitted through a number of third
states without the sender knowing about it or being able to control it.98 The
transit states are not, and would not want to be, held accountable for data
sent through their territory, and likewise, the sending state would not want
to be held accountable for violating the sovereignty of the transit states. 99

Accordingly, while states have an affirmative obligation to prevent their
90. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Legal Implications of TerritorialSovereignty in Cyberspace,
2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 7, 11 (C. Czosseck, et al. eds., 2012).
91. Id. at 11.
92. Id.; Tallinn Manual, supra note 16, at 192.
93. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 90, at 12.
94. Jensen, supra note 86, at 298.
95. U.N. Charter art. 51.
96. Koh, supra note 18, at 6.
97. Id.
98. Jensen, supra note 86, at 280.
99. Id.
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territories from being used for attacks against other states and must take
action against those who do, knowledge or presumptive knowledge of the
attack is necessary. 00
Sovereign states are also legally responsible for cyber activities carried out
by private individuals considered to be "proxy actors," who are acting under
the direction, control, or instruction of a State.101

As long as the State

exercises sufficient control over an individual engaged in illegal cyber
activity, the State will assume responsibility for the act.1 02 States also have an
obligation not to allow their state to be used for an act that violates the
territorial integrity of another state, even in the cyber context. 0 3
Notwithstanding, the majority of the Group of Experts drafting the Tallinn
Manual did not believe that the mere failure of a State to police its own
territory, without providing some substantial support or cyber defenses,
would constitute a use of force.104 While again, the attribution challenges of
cyber space make determining when the State is actually involved in a
cyberattack through their own actors or proxy actors, the customary law of
armed conflict has more recently added additional authority to take action
against a state that is "unwilling or unable" to prevent a cyberattack from
occurring.10
Vhile the "unwilling or unable" test may not have been
applied openly in the cyber context yet, its acceptability by the U.S. and
other key allies in the use of force arena indicates that it could ultimately be
applicable for a cyberattack that crossed the line into armed conflict. If the
current sonar attacks in Cuba, for example, cross the line into the threshold
of armed conflict, then the Cuban government, which is "unwilling or
unable" to prevent these attacks from continuing to occur, may end up being
held accountable for these attacks. Certainly, if evidence demonstrates that
the government is providing substantial support or cyber defenses to protect
individuals, then it should already be held accountable.
For cyber activities that have crossed the line into armed conflict, the
concept of neutrality also applies. For the purposes of cyber-attacks,
neutrality applies to a neutral state that is not party to the conflict, as well as
its territorial sea and the outer space above the country. 0 6 These neutral
states are protected from direct attacks and from having cyber weapons
moved across their territory, however they may be subjected to spill-over
100. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 90, at 16.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id. at 17; see Tallinn Manual, supra note 16, at 36.
103. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 90, at 16.
104. Tallin Manual, supra note 16, at 47.
105. Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Who is on Board with "Unwilling or Unable?", LAWFARE
(Oct 10, 2016, 1:55 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/who-board-unwilling-or-unable
(discussing the developing customary international law of the "unwilling or unable" doctrine);
Ashley Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for ExtraterritorialSelfDefense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 499 (2012) (general discussion of development of "unwilling or
unable" doctrine as a norm).
106. Tallinn Manual, supra note 16, at 250.
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effects that may be de minimis to an otherwise legitimate military attack.O7
These neutral states may not knowingly allow any party to the conflict to
establish cyber infrastructure on their territory, or they may lose their status
as neutrals.os Further, a failure of a neutral country to stop a belligerent
from launching offensive cyber activities from their territory will justify
offensive cyber activities against them from the aggrieved State.109
VII.

Other Laws

As indicated in the Introduction, volumes can be written analyzing each of
the above principles of armed conflict and how they may apply in the cyber
context, using both recent examples and hypotheticals. But it is important to
remember that only the narrowest subset of cyber activities end up crossing
the jus ad bellum line into being categorized as an "armed attack." For the
remainder of cyber intrusions, denial of services, intelligence collection and
theft, a full range of State diplomatic and criminal options are still available.
States can use diplomatic engagement, sanctions, or other economic or
political pressure to stop foreign governments from engaging in potentially
unlawful cyber activities. NATO and the UN have spent considerable
resources in discussing approaches to unlawful cyber activities and how to
both deter and criminalize them. Most countries, like the U.S., continue to
criminalize unlawful cyber activities so that they can fine or imprison
individuals who commit cyber-crimes, as long as they can figure out who
they are and apprehend them.io The Snowden case, for example, has shown
the challenges associated with prosecuting an individual who has sought
safe-haven from a foreign country, Russia."' Moving forward, the
development of additional cyber tools to deter unlawful cyber activities will
be critical, as the use of force should only be considered for that small
grouping of cyber activities that cross the line.
VIII.

Conclusion

International law, and specifically the law of armed conflict, does apply in
cyberspace to those cyber activities that have been determined to "cross the
line" from cyber incidents to cyber "attacks" within the meaning of article 51
"self-defense" under the U.N. Charter.112
hile nations have been slow to
recognize this authority, there has been growing consensus on the
applicability of this legal framework and the broader jus in bello rules on
107. Id. at 250-52.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 254.
110. PBS, Computer Crime Laws, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/hackers/
blame/crimelaws.html (last visited June 17, 2018).
111. Andrew Blake, Russia extends asylum for NSA leaker Edward Snowden, Wash. Times (Jan. 19,
2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/19/edward-snowden-nsa-leaker-canstay-in-russia-throu/.

112. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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which it provides some clarity. Notwithstanding, even though there is
consensus that a cyber-attack can be an armed attack, the permanency,
physical damage, and severity of the attack needed to cross this threshold has
ensured that very few attacks seen to date would cross the line into the realm
of conflict."3 The lack of attribution and the unique challenges of
sovereignty in cyber space make the need for clarity and state practice even
more significant.
Once the line has been crossed, however, conflict-based rules on the status
of individuals, legality of weapons, principles of necessity and
proportionality, state sovereignty, and even targeting rules all have some
applicability. Given the very limited subset of attacks that have ever met the
high threshold of "armed attack," there is very little established state
precedent to inform and guide future practice on how exactly all these
conflict-based rules do apply, even though there has been significant
attention and analysis put into thinking through these issues. As with all
armed conflict, unfortunately, to develop the much needed state practice on
the use of force in the cyber context, we will need to witness more cyberattacks that do cross the line.

113. Nakashima, supra note 31.
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